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1 Introduction
This article examines Asian strategies for improving
governance and the effectiveness of state
institutions. It reviews interpretations of governance
that are relevant and appropriate to the Asian
context and how these complement or differ from
broader definitions. The article considers the rich
variety of experience across Asia, in terms of
variations in types of regimes, governance indicators
and trajectories of reform. It takes stock of Asian-led
approaches to improved governance by considering
the varied impetus for reform in different countries
of the region, as well as how far measures designed
to improve the effectiveness and accountability of
state institutions have generated positive outcomes
for growth and poverty reduction.
The article demonstrates that successful approaches
are premised on country ownership of reform
initiatives, incremental approaches that strengthen
political commitment, and an extended timeframe
for implementation. It concludes that there is
considerable scope for sharing lessons of successful
experience more widely through bilateral initiatives
and regional organisations, and through aid donors
supporting Asian-led approaches through
appropriate entry points for reform that are
politically feasible and can generate public support.
2 Pathways to better governance
2.1 Definitions and scope
Governance has a wide variety of meanings, ranging
from a narrow concern with the manner in which
the state acquires the authority to manage public
goods and services, through to the accountable,
transparent and legitimate use of state power. Other
approaches emphasise the importance of
participation in decision-making processes and the
linkages between civil liberties and poverty reduction.
From the perspective of most Asian countries, the
extent to which the state creates an institutional
environment that maximises the opportunities for
growth and poverty reduction is the most critical
dimension of governance.1 It also accords with a
perspective to which many bilateral and multilateral
aid donors subscribe. The Asian Development Bank
(ADB), for example, lists accountability, participation,
predictability and transparency in its definition of
governance. The UK Department for International
Development (DFID) highlights four interrelated
elements of effective states: authority, responsiveness,
accountability and legitimacy, which resonate strongly
with emerging Asian governance priorities.2
The state is central to Asian-led strategies for
promoting growth and poverty reduction. A
supportive policy environment to foster trade,
investment and technological development is a
critical determinant of the economic success of many
countries in the region. Government policy designed
to mitigate the effects of rapid growth has an
important bearing on sustainability, through
strategies to manage the adverse environmental
consequences of rapid industrialisation and to
address growing inequality between regions and
social groups.
Public investment in infrastructure or human capital
plays an important role in shaping development
prospects. Sustained public investment in roads,
bridges, ports and communications is associated with
higher rates of trade and investment. Governments
that have invested heavily in education reap the
benefits of a skilled workforce that attracts
investment and creates employment opportunities.
Capable states in Asia have skilled and motivated
public bureaucracies. The public sector remains a
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major source of formal employment in many Asian
countries. Graduates from leading universities in the
region seek top positions in government but there
are now growing employment opportunities in the
private sector. Several countries are in a process of
transition from recruitment and promotion systems
characterised by patronage and seniority to ones in
which qualifications and merit predominate.
Privatisation and public sector reform are also
changing the role of public servants from an
emphasis on administration to management, where
top-down controls are giving way to flexible
regulatory structures.
But the continued centrality of state institutions in
many Asian countries also poses governance
challenges. Corruption is a problem faced to varying
degrees by many Asian countries, mirroring the
experience of Western countries in earlier phases of
development. Corruption diverts scarce public
resources to private ends, it acts as a disincentive to
investment, and places a disproportionate burden on
poor consumers of public services. Governments in
the region have been making efforts to contain the
problem through the formation of anti-corruption
agencies, vigilance commissions and improved legal
measures to punish corrupt officials. These are
beginning to produce results, but more can be done
to reduce the opportunities and incentives for
corruption.
Government bureaucracies are often unresponsive to
citizens’ demands and lack transparency in managing
public resources. And yet several countries in the
region promote financial management reforms to
improve budgeting procedures, the predictability of
expenditure forecasts, and financial accountability.
Others are engaged in a steady process of
decentralisation to bring government closer to
people at the local level.
Greater openness about governance challenges need
not be perceived as a threat to governments in the
region. Growing recognition that failure to address
pressing governance challenges may retard growth
and deepen inequality has spurred many Asian
governments into taking action.
2.2 Bridging governance perspectives
Governance is not only a matter of structural
attributes of states. It is also about values, processes
and outcomes. For example, establishing an anti-
corruption commission is easier than making it into
an effective deterrent against corruption based on a
broader social consensus. It is important to
acknowledge that governance reform priorities may
differ among distinct social groups. The
predominance of elite perceptions of governance in
policy and public discourse underlines the need to
complement institutional and legal approaches with
a focus on the rights and needs of the poor. The
everyday reality of the poor and the marginalised in
particular, and for citizens as a whole, is as important
as the constitution and the legal framework for
framing governance reform priorities.
Differing perspectives on reform priorities may also
be seen in more practical terms. Politicians, for
example, are likely to be more concerned about the
political implications of different kinds of reform and
might give priority to those that increase satisfaction
among their supporters. Bureaucrats may favour
technocratic solutions over those that require
greater social engagement and broaden
participation. Aid donors tend to emphasise the
efficient management of public resources and
greater accountability in the use of these resources.
Economic elites might prioritise reforms that
improve their capacity to do business and generate
profits by holding government bureaucracies to
account and improving the security environment.
Poor people, in contrast, are more likely to
emphasise the availability of services and the linkages
between personal security and improved livelihoods.
For these reasons it cannot be assumed that
different social and political actors have similar
priorities. The challenge lies in resolving the trade-
offs between these competing perspectives. Greater
agreement on core governance priorities in the
region can generate the social consensus necessary
to take the reform agenda forward.
Bridging governance perspectives is not only required
for reform objectives but also for clarity on how
these will be achieved. Producing tangible benefits in
the short term is often a necessary first step to
opening up larger reform agendas. Recent examples
from Bangladesh are the campaign against cheating
in public examinations and enhanced security in
public markets during festival periods. These serve
the crucial function of high visibility changes that
build citizens’ trust in the possibility of deeper
reform. More ambitious and challenging reforms
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need to be assessed in terms of their political
feasibility and the context into which they will be
introduced. The overall goal of better government
performance is not advanced when governments
promise actions that are not politically or
bureaucratically feasible or when they cannot deliver
on their promises. The challenge is not so much on
the ambition and duration of the reform agenda, but
rather how reforms are introduced and sustained in
the real world.
Real-life constraints impinging on the potential
receptiveness of political actors to governance issues
also merit attention. In open political systems,
maintaining political capacity vis-à-vis contenders for
power is a basic imperative for politicians. Such
preoccupations often result in predatory behaviour
but are often protective and discourage active
engagement on governance issues. A less
acknowledged constraint is the pressure for
responding to the electorate’s expectations of
‘development’, which often translates into visible
infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools and
hospitals. Better appreciation of how citizens
understand development priorities highlights the
value of investing in new symbols, which promote
growth and poverty reduction and allow for stronger
engagement on governance goals.
It is also important to acknowledge that not all
desirable governance outcomes are amenable to
immediate policy intervention. In many areas of social,
institutional and political behaviour, the challenge
often requires gradual acceptance of societal norms
as much as policy action. The comparatively recent
phenomenon of queuing for a bus on the streets of
Dhaka is a classic illustration of norm graduation, a
change brought about not by policy but through a
shared realisation by a sufficient number of people
that queuing is appropriate behaviour. For policy
making to be successful it is important to be clear
about the limits of policy. Citizens’ responsibilities in
creating ethical, behavioural and work standards in
critical areas of social, political and professional life
cannot be overlooked.
2.3 Governance and the Millennium Development
Goals in Asia
While better governance is a compelling goal in its
own right, within the Millennium Development Goal
(MDG) context, making governance work for the
poor is the greater challenge. Exploring the reasons
why governance is germane to MDG attainment and
the broader fight against poverty is critical to a
sharper formulation of governance priorities. To a
significant extent, the issue here is a better
understanding of where the perceived governance
‘needs’ of the poor lie.
These would appear to be in the following areas: 
(1) better service–delivery, particularly in the areas of
health and education; (2) reduction of leakages in
targeted anti-poverty programmes; (3) access to
justice; (4) regulatory support to the informal and
unorganised sectors of the economy where a
majority of the poor pursue their livelihoods; 
(5) better support in coping with disasters; and 
(6) reduction of income erosion threats to the poor
due to various forms of insecurity and improper
application of power. Above and beyond these
priorities, the poor share with the rest of society
two common governance ‘needs’: increasing the
strategic efficiency of the state to address growth
and distributive justice, and democratisation of the
discourse and practice of power. However, progress
has been uneven both in the acknowledgement of
these governance priorities and in their fulfilment.
A word of caution is necessary here. The policy
emphasis on the MDGs that has been so
instrumental in broadening the development
discourse is beginning to result in some unintended
consequences. The emphasis on summary indicators,
such as enrolment rates, has unwittingly spawned a
‘shortcut mentality’ among political leaders and
other actors on the operational challenge of
achieving human development. Political dividends are
being sought in a rather narrow interpretation of
performance and this often appears to be coming at
the cost of a more holistic and strategic engagement
with the education challenge. Asian success stories
on education – from Japan, Malaysia and Sri Lanka –
have precisely been those which from the beginning
adopted a holistic and strategic formulation of
education policy. Clearly, for Asian countries with
large poverty-stricken populations, a simplistic access
paradigm is not enough and needs to be combined
with a focus on quality.
2.4 Big solutions, small solutions
There is also a mindset challenge in being more
effective in addressing pressing governance priorities.
The governance agenda is often formulated in the
language of ‘big solutions’, while neglecting the
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window of ‘small solutions’ which can be initiated
quickly with much less of a challenge for policy
innovation. A recent useful contrast here relates to
the ‘big solution’ of reforming the land record
system in Bangladesh. Though efforts on this front
are nearly a decade old, progress to date has
remained elusive. In contrast, an effective ‘small
solution’ was the recent change in the Stamp Act in
Bangladesh, a small administrative innovation by a
reform-minded bureaucrat, which has produced
multiple benefits. In one modest stroke, the
amendment has led to cost savings for the
government, removed some of the institutional
sources of corruption around the printing,
distribution and forgery of stamp papers, reduced
the bureaucratic load on the sub-registry offices, and
reduced the hassle for the buyers and sellers of land.
An active search for such ‘small solutions’ has been a
missing focus in the contemporary governance
agenda. Micro-governance agendas are important
not only because they can prove to be effective entry
points to pry open intractable macro-governance
agendas, but because they can also provide a real-life
demonstration of what is feasible in contexts which
may not be amenable to more ambitious reform.3
2.5 From decentralisation to local governance
The traditional discourse on decentralisation with its
statist focus on local governments no longer accords
with ground realities where migration is a
pronounced phenomenon, integration into the
globalisation process is well under way, and newer
social forces are on the horizon with which local
governments must find meaningful linkages.
Changing ground realities in effect require a
transition to a new paradigm, one of local
governance with an emphasis on livelihoods (Rahman
and Aminul Islam 2002). Local governance broadens
the focus beyond local governments to include non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), community
organisations and the private sector, and highlights
the importance of combined efforts towards
concrete and specific goals. A two-track strategy is
increasingly called for: a political agenda of
administrative and financial devolution, and a
functional agenda of service delivery, disaster
management, affordable justice, and local economic
regeneration for which local governments build
viable coalitions with these social actors.
The importance of the two-track strategy can be
seen from the contrasting outcomes in Bangladesh
and the neighbouring Indian state of West Bengal.
West Bengal has had a much publicised and
successful decentralisation programme in contrast to
Bangladesh, where local governments have remained
very much subordinate to the central administration.
A comparison of outcomes on the ground, however,
offers some striking insights. While the strong
political decentralisation process in West Bengal has
created an impregnable electoral fortress for the
ruling political alliance in the state, the politically
weaker Bangladesh experience appears to have
compensated for lack of progress in political
devolution through better social outcomes.
Bangladesh villages stand out for their superior
infrastructure and social indicators on health and
education (World Bank/ADB 2002).
2.6 Importance of evidence and indicators
Evidence on governance requires both the credible
generation of data and conceptually sound
interpretation. Statistical agencies, independent
research institutions and civil society organisations all
have a role to play in addressing the empirical and
analytical challenge. In this regard, evidence on
corruption has tended to be strongly influenced by
an emotive approach that focuses on perceptions
and beliefs. Even though it is derived from real-life
experience, such an approach ends up highlighting a
narrow institutional agenda centred on deterrence
while neglecting the imperative of building a wider
political consensus around corruption and its causes.
The development of indicators that are appropriate
to local context can give rise to a broader reform
agenda and facilitate monitoring of progress.
The Asian record of robust growth and inadequate
political governance highlights the urgency of
unpacking the governance debate. Do all aspects of
governance have to move in tandem or does it make
sense to distinguish between political and economic
governance and the possibility of differential
progress? It is in the search for answers to this and
other less than obvious questions that the Asian
experience offers lessons for replication elsewhere
and for identifying the critical gaps which Asian
countries must address in their journey forward.
3 Lessons from Asian experiences on governance
initiatives
3.1 Governance regimes in Asia
Sustained growth and poverty reduction has taken
place under a range of different governance regimes
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in Asia. State-led industrialisation with trade
liberalisation was the principal driver of rapid growth
and poverty reduction in East Asia, with concerted
attention to lagging regions through resource
transfers. Substantial progress was achieved by
capable, centralised governments in countries as
varied as South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and
1970s, and China and Vietnam in the 1990s.
Progress under competitive regimes in South Asia
has been more gradual. Economic growth
accelerated in the 1990s in Bangladesh, India and Sri
Lanka as a result of selective trade and price
liberalisation but without fundamental improvements
in state capacity and the calibre of the public service.
Steady progress was achieved in poverty reduction
through a combination of employment generation
and targeted transfers to poorer regions and
communities.
Less progress has been achieved under partial
democracies in Cambodia and Pakistan, which are
characterised by political instability and a legacy of
authoritarian rule. Growth performance has been
modest while progress on poverty reduction and the
MDGs is limited.
States ruled by autocratic governments and facing
large-scale insurrection – such as Burma and Nepal –
have made least progress. Poor economic
performance and limited progress on poverty
reduction have gone hand in hand with problems of
governance. Political instability has deterred
investment, while the ability of the state to address
poverty is limited by capacity constraints and
diversion of public resources to military spending.
Hence, no single model of governance is associated
with positive growth and poverty outcomes across
Asia; there has been progress both in centralised East
Asian polities and democratic governments in South
Asia. Sustained progress on growth and poverty in
East Asia was achieved under capable states but
progress on other dimensions of governance followed
later. In South Asia, the achievements on growth and
poverty reduction were more modest but many
countries maintained a positive record on governance.
While the greatest challenges emanate from problems
of authoritarian rule and weak capacity in failing states
or unconsolidated democracies, there is an impetus
towards improvements in governance in a number of
Asian countries.
3.2 Drivers of governance reforms
Patterns of governance in successful Asian
economies are changing. A variety of factors are at
work, ranging from the effects of domestic
liberalisation, responses to globalisation and
international trade regimes, to demands for better
governance voiced by citizens (Cheung and Scott
2003a). A further factor is the influence exercised by
aid donors, through programmatic support for
governance initiatives developed by Asian
governments or aid conditionality.
Over the past two decades, many countries in Asia
have followed the path of economic liberalisation
through deregulation, privatisation and public sector
reform. This has fundamentally changed the role and
functions of the state, from economic intervention
through the public sector to creating a regulatory
regime to encourage private economic activity. State
action is increasingly geared towards creating the
right policy and institutional environment to facilitate
growth, rather than on controls and directives.
Globalisation and increased trade have exposed Asian
economies to competitive pressures and global
standards. Far from undermining progress, most
Asian countries have adjusted their policies and
institutional practices to take advantage of the new
global trading regime under the auspices of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Conformity with
WTO standards has required changes in trade policy,
adjustment to new tariff regimes and the acquisition
of new knowledge and capacity. Asian governments
have responded to the challenge of globalisation
through more robust engagement in WTO
negotiations, more aggressive export promotion and
deepening expertise on trade policy (Weiss 2003).
The 1997 financial crisis in East Asia has vividly
demonstrated how economic problems can result
from poor governance, and governments in the
region are taking steps to avert recurrence of such
an event.
A third source of reform lies in citizen-led demands
for better governance. Rising expectations of greater
responsiveness on the part of governments are not
confined to elected governments in the region. For
example, the 2002 World Values Survey shows a
striking breadth of public support for a democratic
form of government in East Asia across countries
and various types of regime. Democratic aspirations
among East Asians are only marginally lower than
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their fellow citizens in North America (Dalton and
Shin 2003).4 While citizens may not actively mobilise
for improvements in governance, there is a
groundswell of popular support for reforms that
improve the efficiency, accountability and
transparency of government, as revealed by public
opinion surveys and media coverage.5 A growth in
the number of taxpayers provides further impetus
towards accountability in the use of public resources.
At times, organised citizens – business people, NGOs
and social activists – have taken the initiative in
responding to problems of poor governance, which
in turn can provoke action from the relevant
authorities and lead to the scaling up of local
initiatives. For example, local businesses in the
Pakistan city of Karachi instigated the formation of
citizen–police liaison committees to address the
problem of crime and extortion (Masud 2002). In
rural Bangladesh, NGO efforts to improve the
dispute–resolution process have led to alternative
dispute–resolution mechanisms gaining acceptance in
law.6 The right to information movement in
Rajasthan was very influential in persuading state and
national governments in India to enact right to
information legislation.
Aid donors can influence the governance agenda in
Asian countries through the provision of financial
resources and technical advice. This can be significant
in the less-developed countries of the region that
receive more aid, such as Bangladesh, Cambodia and
Nepal, and provide an important impetus for
galvanising domestic reform initiatives. But in
general, aid donors have not played a critical role in
promoting governance reform in the region,
particularly in the larger countries such as China and
India, which are less amenable to external
engagement. On the whole, attempts to exert
conditionality over poor governance indicators or the
slow pace of reform have not resulted in significant
progress or strengthened implementation.
3.3 Asian-led approaches to improved governance
While some of the factors propelling governance
reform in Asia are common across countries, these
have followed different trajectories in line with
variations in regime characteristics, political culture,
state capacity and levels of societal mobilisation.
South Asian political culture tends towards pluralism
and lack of conformity, rendering it more challenging
for governments to build consensus around shared
vision and values. Governance reforms in South Asia
are frequently characterised by weak political
commitment, limited bureaucratic capacity and
uneven public support. National and state
governments in the Indian subcontinent have tended
to pursue an incremental approach, where reforms
do not command significant visibility, where they do
not threaten vested political or bureaucratic
interests, and where there is scope to marshal public
support (Manor 2006). But incremental approaches
often require a protracted time period for visible
results to be achieved.
There are some positive examples of governance
reform from South Asia, where committed
politicians have introduced a range of reforms
designed to improve the accountability and
effectiveness of government. These include the state
governments of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and
Madhya Pradesh in India, where a range of reform
experiments were rolled out by chief ministers from
the late 1990s. But in each case, the governments
that had introduced the reforms were subsequently
voted out of power in state elections, highlighting
the difficulty of mobilising political support for
governance reforms.
Domestic political commitment enhances the
political feasibility of governance reform and takes
attention away from a prescriptive donor agenda.
Politicians in South Asia have used donor support to
their advantage in mobilising financial support and
technical assistance for reforms, but distance
themselves from donors when reform initiatives
provoke domestic criticism.
East Asian governments, by comparison, tend to be
strongly institutionalised, centralised and conformist.
There is a relatively high level of bureaucratic
capacity, especially at higher levels of the civil service
and in technocratic policy-making units. There is a
strong sense of political direction and vision, but
relatively limited scope and capacity for social
mobilisation.
The domestic impetus for governance reform in East
Asia varies across countries. Most reforms have
emanated from a strong sense of political
commitment and several governments in the region
have not shied away from difficult reforms. Political
leaders in some countries have sought to make a
political virtue out of government modernisation,
such as Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore and Mahathir
Mohamad in Malaysia in the 1980s, who used their
authority to create special units in their respective
prime ministerial offices to drive the reform process.7
Some categories of reform are motivated by the
desire to preserve social stability and to prevent
public discontent (in response to poor governance)
from posing a threat.8
Technological innovation is an important source of
reform and facilitates new types of reform centred
on e-governance initiatives that can produce
significant changes through the applied use of
information and communications technology (ICT)
(computerisation, information storage and retrieval
and communications). Access to information
initiatives is also made possible through the active
adoption of new technology.
3.4 Record of governance initiatives in Asia
Asian governments have devised a range of
governance initiatives to improve the accountability,
efficiency and performance of state institutions.
These can be divided into (a) administrative reforms
which aim to strengthen core state functions and the
transparency and accountability of government, and
(b) decentralisation and service delivery reforms
designed to promote voice and accountability in local
government. The latter set of reforms have greater
potential to make a direct contribution to poverty
reduction by widening participation in decision
making and ensuring that resources are directed to
where they are most needed through improved
allocative efficiency.
Administrative reforms
Administrative reforms include civil service reform,
accountability reform and managerial reform
(Schneider and Heredia 2003). Civil service reforms
aim to improve incentives for public servants and
make structural changes that reduce staff numbers,
reorganise departments and limit state functions.
Accountability reforms aim to prevent the abuse of
power and improve responsiveness to citizens
through improved legislative oversight, anti-
corruption initiatives and measures to strengthen
transparency, such as e-governance. Managerial
reforms aim to improve the efficiency of the civil
service by encouraging competition, outsourcing,
and the creation of arms-length executive agencies
(Nunberg 1995). These reforms are often combined
in different ways and may not be mutually exclusive,
but such distinctions highlight the feasibility and
potential entry points for different reform
strategies.9
Few governments in the region have developed
ambitious civil service reform programmes entailing
significant retrenchment on account of their political
sensitivity. Only where the repercussions of making
large numbers of civil servants redundant can be
accommodated politically does one find evidence of
such reforms.
While the significance of civil service reform for
improving public sector management has been
acknowledged by successive governments in India,
there has been limited progress on structural change
and administrative reorganisation due to the
sensitivity and difficulty of this type of reform.
Efforts to downsize the bureaucracy have usually
encountered stiff resistance from trade unions or
political parties seeking to derive political capital
from opposition to such measures, as state
governments in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya
Pradesh found to their cost. But the government of
India appointed a new Administrative Reforms
Commission in August 2005, charged with
identifying measures for overhauling India’s
administrative system, which signals fresh political
commitment.
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Box 1 Improving the civil service in China
The Chinese government implemented a series of deep cuts in the core civil service in the 1990s to
reduce the financial burden of an overextended bureaucracy, entailing staffing reductions in the order
of 30 per cent. The impact of China’s civil service reform programme is significant. Changes in
recruitment policy towards greater emphasis on merit have led to dramatic improvements in the
education level of civil servants, with the proportion of leading bureaucratic cadres possessing a
university degree rising from 20 to 80 per cent from 1980 to 1998. Alongside this trend, the average
age of top officials has also fallen significantly. These changes have in turn contributed to
improvements in capacity (Burns 2003; Naughton 2005).
More commonplace and politically palatable are
administrative reforms designed to improve incentives.
These include pay and pension reform, improved
recruitment and promotion procedures, and better
training opportunities. Many governments in the
region have pursued these types of measures with
varying degrees of success. Malaysia overhauled the
pay and promotion system for the civil service in the
early 1990s to strengthen the merit principle and
systematise performance-based enhancements. India
substantially improved salary levels for civil servants
following the recommendations of the Fifth Pay
Commission in 1997 but did not follow through with
broader governance reforms and reductions in the
core civil service as proposed by the commission. China
introduced an examination-based entry system for the
civil service to enhance professional standards, and has
upgraded formative training for new entrants. The
government of Pakistan has embarked on a large-scale
professional development programme for senior civil
servants in federal and provincial governments to
upgrade skills and capacity in the public service.
Financial management reforms
Financial management reforms have been pursued
with vigour by a number of governments in the
region. These have the advantage of having a lower
political profile, they are unlikely to provoke
significant resistance, and can produce significant
benefits in terms of improved transparency and
efficiency.
The Cambodian government has implemented a
series of activities to strengthen public financial
management from the mid-1990s in the form of
improvements to the budget system, public
accounting and the audit system supported by new
laws and regulations. A key element of the current
financial management reform programme centres
on reform to treasury operations and budget
formulation and execution to strengthen the
credibility of the budget process and improve
financial accountability. Key features of this process
are consistent promotion of reforms over an
extended time-frame, demonstrable government
ownership of the reform process, and the cumulative
introduction of incremental reforms.
Anti-corruption measures
There has been much less progress with measures to
combat corruption, which can provoke resistance
from entrenched interests in the bureaucracy and
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Box 2 E-governance initiatives in India
Several governments have actively pursued e-governance initiatives as a means of improving the
transparency and efficiency of government operations. E-governance initiatives also have the
advantage of being less politically sensitive and can galvanise support from citizens who benefit from
speedier transactions and reduced corruption. The Bhoomi programme in the south Indian state of
Karnataka, which entails the computerisation of land records, is welcomed by farmers who can access
information on landholdings in less time and with greater accuracy. E-governance is used by the state
governments of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh to speed up the processing and payment of
property taxes, which reduces the scope for arbitrary action by government officials and builds public
support for ‘small solutions’.
Box 3 Financial management reforms in Bangladesh
The Bangladesh government pursued a series of reforms in budgeting and expenditure control over a
ten-year period from the mid-1990s. The aim was to introduce modern budgeting and expenditure
management and control techniques through improved accounting procedures, computerisation and
capacity building. The reforms only had modest impact in the initial stages since they ran into
opposition from entrenched interests in the bureaucracy, which resisted new ways of working. Critical
to success was an incremental approach to reform with built-in flexibility that allowed for
adjustments, a high level of domestic ownership, and consistent leadership at the top level. In the
later stage of the initiative, greater progress was achieved under the leadership of the Minister of
Finance who exerted significant influence over the direction and pace of the project. While the more
ambitious objectives of the programme were not realised, the initiative built a constituency for
reform within the civil service and created a foundation for further stages of more ambitious reform.
the white-collar trade unions. Asian governments
recognise the problems caused by corruption, but
few have taken comprehensive action to tackle it.10
The two best-known examples of successful
initiatives to tackle corruption are from the two city
states of Hong Kong and Singapore, where a
combination of a well-resourced anti-corruption
agency, effective follow-up and prosecution, and
improved pay and conditions significantly reduced
the extent of the problem.11
Most Asian countries have set up similar bodies with
varying degrees of success. A review of anti-
corruption institutions in Vietnam, for example,
highlights how deep-seated reforms require a
lengthy process of reform on many fronts, centred
on the creation of new institutions and a supportive
legislative framework (Wescott 2002). The formation
of the Anti-Corruption Commission in Indonesia was
delayed by four years following parliamentary
approval of anti-corruption legislation. Similarly, the
government of Bangladesh introduced legislation
governing the formation of a new Anti-Corruption
Commission, but the process of implementation was
rushed in response to donor pressure, the
organisation lacks rules of operation, its effectiveness
has been undermined, and consequently it lacks
wider credibility.
Decentralisation
Decentralisation experiences have been driven both
by political considerations and by the desire to
improve local accountability and service delivery.
India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Pakistan have all
followed a big-bang approach with an emphasis on
devolution of powers, while Bangladesh, Nepal and
Sri Lanka have followed a cautious, incremental
approach with limited devolution of power and
resources. Political motivations for decentralisation
have included building grassroots support for political
parties (West Bengal in India), reducing provincial
opposition to national government (Pakistan), and
counteracting pressures for secession (Indonesia).
China offers another motive for reform where local
governments in selected zones have been invested
with an entrepreneurial function in the service of
economic growth.
In general, decentralisation has provided
opportunities for large numbers of people, including
women, to participate in local government bodies.
However, service delivery outcomes have varied
considerably and there is an absence of conclusive
evidence to demonstrate the benefits of
decentralisation for health and education. An
approach to local governance bringing in multiple
stakeholders and with a clear focus on resource
issues potentially yields greater dividends for poverty
reduction and service delivery than a narrow political
formulation of the decentralisation agenda. For
example, while political decentralisation is not a
current government priority in Bangladesh, rural
people have benefited from a stronger focus on
service delivery in which a variety of actors, including
local officials, NGOs, community organisations,
central government agencies and the private sector,
have all played a part. This does not mean that
efforts to promote political decentralisation are
unwarranted but that improvements at the local
level can occur in the absence of elected local
governments.
3.5 Implementation and impact
Broad-based, comprehensive governance reform is
not evident in most Asian countries. There has been
limited progress on civil service reform and
downsizing of bureaucracies, uneven commitment to
anti-corruption with limited evidence of successful
implementation, and some progress with financial
management reform. Reforms tend to be piecemeal
and incremental, with modest success in improving
systems, building incentives and strengthening
capacity, in the process creating a stronger basis for
more enduring institutional change. This highlights
the importance of politically feasible approaches that
emanate from domestic political commitment and
are led by champions of reform within the
bureaucracy. It points to the value of multiple,
cumulative and progressive initiatives rather than
one-off institutional reforms.
There is recognition that political factors are a critical
determinant of the success of governance and
institutional reform projects in Asia. However,
institution building can encounter political obstacles
which in turn undermine effective implementation.
For example, new institutions in Indonesia designed
to tackle governance problems such as the National
Law Commission and the office of the Ombudsman
have been under-funded and lack political support,
highlighting the limitations of reform initiatives that
do not receive adequate political backing.
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3.6 Implications for growth and poverty reduction
While Asia as a whole has witnessed commendable
growth and poverty reduction in the past 25 years,
experience brings out at least three compelling
rationales why a governance focus is likely to be
central in the next phase of development.
First is the continuing scale of poverty in Asia. Seven
out of ten of the world’s poor still reside in Asia.
Obviously, the scale of the challenge means that
considerable time will be required to eliminate the
problem of poverty. More worrying is that across
Asia, the success stories on growth are accompanied
by the very visible phenomenon of social exclusion in
terms of the large number of people left behind –
the spread of urban slums, low-quality rural service
delivery, and a growing social divide in the quality of
education. This growing problem of relative poverty,
particularly in the most populous states such as
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines
and Pakistan, is generating social and political
tensions which may derail the undoubted progress in
growth and poverty reduction, and is a major
governance challenge. Clearly, the urgency of
ensuring pro-poor orientation of the growth process
cannot be overstated.
Second, Asia is also witnessing more intensified
vulnerabilities to natural disasters that put a premium
on governance capacities. The 2004 tsunami and the
2005 earthquake in Kashmir provide a stark reminder
of the disproportionate burden of these disasters on
the poor, as well as the importance of
institutionalising an effective response and building
state capacity in terms of early warning and
improved national and regional capacity for disaster
mitigation and management.
A third emerging governance challenge in the region
is that of personal security. Insecurity carries an
economic price, especially in fragile states and
regions, often translating into quantifiable income
erosion (Rahman 1995). For example, the case of
poor people in remote areas of Nepal highlights a
perceived connection between poor services,
insecurity and a deteriorating political environment.
Even where opportunity frontiers are expanding, not
all the available opportunities are accessed on
account of the insecurities prevalent in the public
domain. This is particularly true for women. The
quality of the criminal justice system and access to
affordable justice have become as important
determinants of how well the poor are
accommodated in the growth process as trade and
investment policies.
3.7 Examples of good practice in Asia
Asian experience offers a rich diversity of successful
governance initiatives. Examples extend not only to
systemic initiatives but also to quality institutions,
scaling up micro-initiatives, and programmatic
interventions focused on specific needs.12
Experience in the region demonstrates that it is
possible to achieve a high level of social development
(and mitigate the worst manifestations of poverty) in
the absence of a thriving economy if the government
sets the right priorities. South Korea, Sri Lanka and
Malaysia offer a variety of routes to high educational
status, decreased child mortality and low fertility.
Heavy social investment in these countries came early
in their development process, despite low levels of per
capita incomes at the time. Several common policy
lessons emerge from this experience. First, the
leading role of the state in the financing and provision
of basic social services – regardless of whether the
economy was centrally planned or market-oriented –
was critical. There was not exclusive reliance on the
free play of market forces in service provision, nor on
trickle-down of the benefits of economic growth.
Second, high policy priority was given to health and
education. Third, the equity and efficiency of spending
was of paramount importance. Sustained public
investments in basic services were possible because
they were low in cost, and high in effectiveness.
Fourth, as regards sequencing, investment in basic
education preceded or accompanied the
breakthrough in infant mortality reduction and
expansion in public health provision. The synergies
between interventions in health and education are
critical to the success of each and increase the return
to each investment. Finally, underlying all the above,
lay women’s agency, i.e. the freedom conferred on
women to work outside the home, the freedom to
earn an independent income and the freedom to
have independent property rights.
Asia offers many examples of quality institutions that
contribute to positive governance outcomes. The
anti-corruption agencies of Singapore and Hong
Kong are widely recognised for the impact they have
had in tackling corruption in those city states. Less
well known is the emergence of the Election
Commission in India as a vital actor in disciplining the
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electoral process and thereby improving the
functioning of Indian democracy. The importance of
the Indian Election Commission lies not in any new
legislation per se but rather in its emergence since
the mid-1990s as an independent-minded body that
is willing and able to assert the authority vested in it
by law. Indeed, it is fair to say that governance
problems often emanate from dormant capacities
and lack of assertion even when legal provisions
exist. It is precisely through greater assertiveness and
by incrementally developing codes of conduct,
clearer eligibility criteria and improved by-laws that
the Indian Election Commission is transforming itself
into a critical guardian of the democratic process.
A third category of good practice has been the
successful scaling-up of proven local-level initiatives.
Pioneered by committed social activists working in
the context of rural development in the Indian state
of Rajasthan, the campaign on right to information
graduated to a national law in 2005. The
transformation of this micro-level experience into
national legislation resulted from a campaign which
drew the support of the national political leadership
and involved a protracted process of bargaining with
civil society activists all the way through to the
details of the legislation. The law is now a reality but,
as with many policy windows, the real challenge
now is how effectively the opportunity is utilised.
The fourth category of good practice is
programmatic success on specific needs in otherwise
poor governance environments. The sanitation
campaign in Bangladesh provides a useful illustration
of this process. Bangladesh appears poised to achieve
the MDG target on sanitation. Key to this
achievement is a number of interlinked factors. There
is broad ownership of the agenda by the
government. At the level of implementation,
however, the key driver has been a mobilisational
approach in which local governments, NGOs,
community-based organisations (CBOs), the media
and the private sector have all played a part. Critical
to progress has also been the systematic
identification of intermediate milestones – from
open space defaecation to fixed-point defaecation,
from hanging latrines into semi-sanitary ring-slab
latrines, and finally the next and final stage, in which
the goal is to universalise water-sealed ring-slab
latrines. This low-threshold technology, i.e.
production of concrete rings and slabs, has allowed
for an impetus to localised production with a
consequent boost to the local economy.
Another example of programmatic success has been
the revolution in mobile telephony that is sweeping
across poor countries and regions of South and
South-east Asia. Poor people in rural areas now have
much improved access to information and can
communicate with the outside world in ways that
were inconceivable a decade ago.
It may also be instructive to examine why some
practices fail to graduate to the status of good
practices. For example, substandard and insecure
housing conditions are recognised as a crucial aspect
of urban poverty. In most large cities in the
developing world, the formal housing market serves
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Box 4 Local government and rural roads in Bangladesh
A very different type of quality institution with significant implications for economic growth is the
Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) in Bangladesh. Drawing on traditions rooted in
the Comilla integrated rural development model of the 1960s and driven by charismatic leadership,
the LGED emerged as a strategic service agency within the bureaucratic reality of a post-colonial
state, spearheading the creation of rural infrastructure. Since coming to the fore in the early 1990s,
LGED’s rural roads have contributed to a growth dynamic in which many parts of rural Bangladesh
have been largely freed from the curse of remoteness, the physical reality of an integrated national
economy has been expedited, and the poor have become increasingly mobile and able to migrate to
sources of employment. Key institutional aspects contributing to LGED’s success have included: 
(1) organisational decentralisation, (2) a professional work culture and recognition of outstanding
achievement, (3) a strong monitoring system, (4) informal decision making, de-emphasising
bureaucratic file movement in favour of increased use of information technology, (5) leadership, 
(6) teamwork, and (7) a sense of mission. However, part of its success is also due to a pragmatic
approach to accommodating political and financial pressures without impinging on work quality. Not
surprisingly, the institution has proved to be adept in surviving in spite of a partisan political environment.
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only a minority of the population. It is estimated that
30–70 per cent live in ‘irregular’ settlements and that
up to 85 per cent of the new housing stock is
produced in an extra-legal manner. However,
effective solutions to this problem have been slow in
coming. Relocation schemes, social housing, slum
upgrading and sites and services are beset by two
related problems: they are far too small-scale to serve
growing demand, and products are far too expensive
to be affordable for low-income groups. The
conventional sequence of planning-servicing-building-
occupation has been identified by some as a key
factor in both market and state failure (Mehrotra
2000). Each of these steps leads to a steep price
increase and speculation, and in effect raw land is
turned into a scarce and expensive commodity. Policy
acceptance of the benefits that arise from reversing
this conventional sequence may be critical to finding
more effective and durable solutions.
However, South Asian experience suggests that not
all implementation failures are due to design flaws.
Lack of political will, improper sequencing, failure to
anticipate and overcome implementation blockages,
absence of participation, solutions that ignore
ground realities, capacity deficits, ethical decay, and
weak system development in the politician–
administrator interface are some of the critical
factors explaining why positive initiatives do not
graduate to the status of good practices.
3.8 Success factors
It may be useful to conclude this section by
highlighting the success factors underlying positive
experiences of governance reform and good practice
in Asia. These include: (1) local ownership rather than
external inducements through aid and conditionality;
(2) political commitment based on recognition of
potential benefits for growth and poverty reduction;
(3) incremental reforms in state institutions focused
on particular problem areas; (4) fostering of quality
institutions with strategic potential for growth,
poverty reduction and governance outcomes; and 
(5) creating demand and support for reform among
clients of services and within civil society. The Asian
experience also underscores the importance of an
extended time horizon and incremental reforms and
the cumulative value of small solutions over big
solutions.
The fact that successful governance reform in Asia
rests on local ownership, political commitment and
incrementalism offers lessons for aid donors, who
need to be in a better position to judge the
prevailing political environment. Priorities are rarely
homogenous across different social and political
groups and a culture of pluralism creates an
environment in which reform can be difficult to
achieve. For example, donors rushed ahead with
support for the Anti-Corruption Commission in
Bangladesh before there was sufficient political
support and credibility. More informed analysis of the
political feasibility of competing reform options and
closer attention to the timing and scope of reforms
would strengthen the value of donor support for
locally generated initiatives.
4 Opportunities and entry points
4.1 Governance as an opportunity frontier
Asia looms large on the global war on poverty.
Enviable growth rates come with a burgeoning
problem of inequality and relative poverty.
Catastrophic vulnerabilities are a new threat.
Although incomes are rising, their sustainability is less
than certain. However, while home to seven out of
ten of the world’s poor, Asia also offers some of the
most dynamic solutions to the challenge of
graduation out of poverty.
As Asia considers its development trajectory over the
next 25 years, governance has become a renewed
opportunity frontier to address existing and
emerging challenges to growth and poverty
reduction. It is a frontier being forged in people’s
aspirations, ground-level practices, and a politically
informed understanding of priorities.
From a governance perspective, initial conditions are
not optimal, certainly not in the transitional societies
of South Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines and the
Mekong Delta countries. An uneasy interface of
politicians and administrators, a ‘winner takes all’
approach to political competition and pressure from
the electorate to deliver visible ‘development results’
all constitute a challenging environment in which a
meaningful governance agenda has to be forged.
And yet there are large dividends to be gained from
an effective engagement on the governance frontier.
Five key lessons from the Asian experience need to
inform the formulation of a new governance
strategy in the service of growth and accelerated
poverty reduction:
1 Improving transparency and accountability in
financial management is a crucial first-order
reform agenda.
2 The state has been a critical actor in shaping
successful development outcomes but the
solutions have not been narrowly statist. The
reformulation of the decentralisation agenda as
one of local governance combining devolution,
resource transfers and improved service delivery
through the mobilisation of a range of local
actors best encapsulates this lesson.
3 The intelligent pursuit of micro-level solutions and
incremental approaches that build up a strategic
momentum for further reform offer a crucial
window of opportunity.
4 Targeted efforts on specific MDGs incorporating
social mobilisational approaches and clear
identification of intermediate milestones can fast-
track results.
5 Improved connectivity – physical and electronic –
can galvanise an empowered citizenry, which in
turn becomes a powerful constituency for
governance reforms.
4.2 Unpacking solutions: a search for entry points
While the broad contours of the governance agenda
are clear, there is an operational challenge of
unpacking solutions and identifying entry points for
Asian governments which offer the greatest
strategic promise and which satisfy the requirement
of political feasibility. Seven such entry points can be
highlighted.
Innovative solutions for tackling corruption
While the problem of corruption remains significant,
an anti-corruption strategy narrowly focused on
deterrence and sanctions has often proved
ineffectual. What is often overlooked in donor-driven
reform initiatives is the need to mobilise a critical
coalition of operational actors and to establish clear
incentives for performance.
For example, a new instrument being developed by
the Ministry of Finance in Bangladesh with support
from DFID will provide performance-based financing
to sector ministries in response to governance
reforms that demonstrably reduce leakage. These
prospectively include a programme to reward
improved school governance, the expansion of a
stipend scheme for girls attending school, and
community management of water supplies in Dhaka.
The intention is that incremental progress in sector
ministries provides a firmer basis for tackling
corruption and reducing the wastage of public
resources can be achieved through the creation of
positive incentives for reform.
Strategic ring-fencing to foster quality institutions
The political capacity to undertake and expedite
systemic changes is often limited in transitional
societies. An important second-best choice (typified
as ‘good enough governance’) is to ring-fence certain
strategic governance functions to facilitate the
creation and insulation of critical pools of higher
institutional quality and link these to larger strategic
change processes (Grindle 2004). Securing political
commitment to second-best choices may be more
feasible than to more ambitious systemic reform
agendas. The precise choice of institutions will vary
across countries but is likely to include the Public
Service Commission (for administrative recruitment),
Election Commission (to serve as a political
watchdog), Central Bank (financial management), the
Supreme Audit institution (to ensure accountability),
and the specialised economic policy units and
infrastructure investment agencies. The argument
about strategic ring-fencing can be extended to the
issue of appointment to top positions in
government. While partisan orientation has become
a political reality in many countries, this need not by
itself defeat governance objectives as long as
eligibility standards are enforced through a
meritocratic selection process.
Promoting micro-level solutions
Reformers have often overlooked the potential of
micro-level solutions to governance problems.
Strategically chosen micro-level solutions create
visible results that can build reform momentum.
Whether it is in the area of local government
reform, criminal justice reform, changes to the land
management system, or in the focus on quality in
basic education, success is often determined by how
effectively micro-level solutions have been identified
and acted upon. Examples abound: the burden of
private tutoring in primary education, the absence of
user-friendly operational manuals, redundant
paperwork, dormant capacities, community policing,
decay in routine oversight and so on.
Promoting a local governance approach to
decentralisation and service delivery
The traditional vocabulary of decentralisation sits
uneasily with rapidly changing ground realities, which
Governance and State Effectiveness in Asia142
are far more sharply focused on service outcomes,
old and new. Recent experience has produced a
wide range of innovative ideas about how to
improve service delivery through community
engagement, contracting out, various forms of
delegation, and privatisation; how to engage
communities and municipalities in development
planning and budget management; and how to build
partnerships with NGOs, the private sector and
communities across a wide range of service
provision. Promoting such an approach to local
governance while strengthening the preconditions
for the transfer of adequate resource and
administrative powers is likely to yield large dividends
for Asia’s poor.
Rekindling a public service ethic
The importance of an ethically committed political
and administrative class in the emerging governance
agenda cannot be overemphasised. Capacity building
and training strategies typically have a narrow
technical focus and are not conversant with real-life
problems. An equally serious drawback has been a
lack of engagement with public service and ethical
concerns, a drawback also encountered in the NGO
and corporate worlds. The challenge is both to
deepen a social discourse and develop specific
training possibilities that can pass the tests of social
credibility and client interest.
Meaningful indices and evidence on governance
The quality and efficacy of the governance discourse
often suffers from poor standards of knowledge of
the process and indicators that can capture such
knowledge. In the absence of such knowledge, a
stereotypical understanding of governance problems
often prevails, making consensus-building for viable
intervention difficult. This is most evident in the case
of popular perceptions of corruption that reflect
everyday experience and in the great interest shown
by the media to the corruption perceptions indices
and surveys collected by international organisations.
The development of domestic indicators to monitor
progress and assist in agenda formulation, not just
from the standpoint of international capital but also
reflecting the aspirations of common people, offers
the prospect of being a powerful driver for change.
Strengthening choice and connectivity
Governance goals are often facilitated when
competition and choice become fundamental
features of physical and social life. Remoteness
renders the possibility of redress so much more
difficult. The expansion of rural road networks can
free rural populations from ties of local dependence
and expand choice horizons. Mobile telephony has
considerable potential for further information
empowerment. Asia in general has had a sustained
focus on improved connectivity. E-governance
initiatives using ICT have considerable potential.
However, much remains to be achieved and a focus
on improved connectivity, both nationally and
regionally, remains a continuing priority.
4.3 Implications for partnerships
Asian governments can demonstrate leadership in
the governance reform agenda in several critical
ways: emphasising the importance of state capacity
as a key factor in successful development outcomes;
demonstrating how strengthening the quality of key
institutions is more feasible than systemic reforms;
showing that incremental, small-scale reforms have
greater potential than big solutions; and highlighting
and disseminating successful innovations in
governance.
Aid donors have invested heavily in governance
reform efforts but with uneven impacts. What
positive lessons emanate from this experience and
what are the implications for future partnerships
with Asian governments and regional organisations?
Aid donors can support governance reform efforts
initiated by Asian governments by: moving from
conditionality to positive encouragement; developing
flexible aid instruments and mutual policy
commitments; providing resources for innovative
approaches (for example, performance-related
initiatives to reduce leakage in service provision);
selective provision of technical assistance and advice;
and facilitating exchange of positive reform
experience in the region and elsewhere. More
consistent pursuit of donor harmonisation and
alignment with respect to supporting improvements
in governance would be welcomed by countries that
continue to receive significant inflows of
development assistance.
Learning from Asian-led approaches to governance
has implications for bilateral partnerships between
Asian countries and for the agendas of regional
organisations. There is scope for more intensified
exchange among Asian countries of experience of
governance reforms that have successfully
strengthened state capacities and enabled
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Annex 1 Indicators of state effectiveness
Country Indicator Most recent Rank Change 1996
value
Afghanistan CPI (2005) 2.5 7 n/a n/a
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –1.35 11 + –1.53
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –2.03 13 – –1.82
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –1.24 13 n/a n/a
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –2.05 13 n/a n/a
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –1.81 13 – – –1.19
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –1.33 13 n/a n/a
Bangladesh CPI (2005) 1.7 13 – 2.29
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –0.69 7 – –0.33
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –1.24 9 – – –0.53
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.72 10 – –0.67
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –1.15 12 – – –0.54
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.86 10 – –0.68
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –1.09 12 – – –0.47
Cambodia CPI (2005) 2.3 10 n/a n/a
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –0.89 8 – –0.68
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –0.6 5 – – –1.15
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.87 11 – –0.58
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –0.25 5 None –0.29
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.98 12 – –0.91
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.97 11 None –0.94
China CPI (2005) 3.2 3 ++ 2.43
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –1.54 12 – –1.29
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –0.07 4 – 0.27
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) 0.11 3 – 0.18
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –0.45 7 – – –0.06
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.47 5 None –0.45
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.51 5 – – –0.01
India CPI (2005) 2.9 5 + 2.63
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) 0.27 1 None 0.28
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –0.81 6 None –0.77
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.04 4 + –0.14
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –0.59 8 – – –0.09
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.09 4 – –0.01
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.31 4 None –0.31
Indonesia CPI (2005) 2.2 11 – 2.65
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –0.44 6 ++ –1.15
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –1.38 10 – – –0.45
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.36 8 – – 0.18
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –0.42 6 – – 0.27
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.91 11 – – –0.36
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.9 10 – – –0.47
Malaysia CPI (2005) 5.1 1 None 5.32
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –0.36 5 + –0.05
WBI – Political Stability (2004) 0.38 1 – – 0.95
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Annex 1 Indicators of state effectiveness (cont.)
Country Indicator Most recent Rank Change 1996
value
Malaysia WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) 0.99 1 – 1.07
(cont.) WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) 0.44 1 – – 0.86
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) 0.52 1 – 0.85
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) 0.29 1 – 0.51
Nepal CPI (2005) 2.5 7 n/a n/a
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –1 9 – – 0.14
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –1.74 12 – – –0.35
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.9 12 – – –0.38
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –0.6 10 – –0.22
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.82 9 – – –0.36
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.61 7 – –0.28
Pakistan CPI (2005) 2.1 12 – 2.53 (1997)
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –1.31 10 – –0.98
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –1.59 11 – –1.21
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.57 9 – –0.4
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –1.03 11 – – –0.57
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.78 8 – –0.44
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.87 9 + –0.98
Philippines CPI (2005) 2.5 7 – 3.05 (1997)
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) 0.02 3 – 0.17
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –1.01 7 – – –0.12
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.23 5 – – 0.19
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –0.06 4 – – 0.45
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.62 7 – – –0.11
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.55 6 – –0.4
Sri Lanka CPI (2005) 3.2 3 – n/a
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –0.16 4 None –0.21
WBI – Political Stability (2004) –1.06 8 – – –1.73
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.27 6 None –0.3
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) 0.21 2 – 0.34
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.03 2 – 0.29
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.16 2 + –0.23
Vietnam CPI (2005) 2.6 6 – 2.79 (1997)
WBI – Voice and Accountability (2004) –1.54 12 – –1.31
WBI – Political Stability (2004) 0.16 2 – 0.4
WBI – Government Effectiveness (2004) –0.31 7 – –0.1
WBI – Regulatory Quality (2004) –0.57 9 None –0.56
WBI – Rule of Law (2004) –0.59 6 – –0.5
WBI – Control of Corruption (2004) –0.74 8 – –0.64
CPI: The Corruption Perceptions Index gives higher values for lower levels of corruption. It is based on the
perceptions of corruption expressed by expert analysts and business people in a variety of surveys.
WBI: The World Bank Institute variables are normalised to 0, and range from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values
indicating better performance. They are based on the aggregation of a range of governance surveys and
indicators. Because the values are normalised from year to year, changes are not absolute changes but,
instead, measures of change relative to other countries.
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Annex 2 Indicators of civil and political rights
Country Indicator Most recent Rank Change 1996
value
Afghanistan Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 5 8 ++ 7
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 6 11 + 7
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) n/a 13 n/a –7
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) n/a 13 n/a 0 (1997)
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 2 8 – 3
Bangladesh Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 4 6 – 3
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 4 5 None 4
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) 6 4 None 6
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 1 6 – 3
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 4 6 – – 7
Cambodia Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 6 10 None 6
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 5 8 + 6
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) 2 7 – 1
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 4 2 + 2
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 5 4 – 7
China Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 7 12 None 7
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 6 11 + 7
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) –7 10 None –7
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 1 6 + 0
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 0 12 None 0
India Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 2 1 ++ 4
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 3 1 + 4
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) 9 1 None 9
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 0 11 None 0
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 6 3 – – 9
Indonesia Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 3 4 ++ 7
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 4 5 ++ 6
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) –7 10 None –7
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 1 6 – 3
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 2 8 + 1
Malaysia Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 4 6 None 4
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 4 5 + 5
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) 3 6 None 3
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 4 2 – 5
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 1 11 – – 5
Nepal Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 5 8 – – 3
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 5 8 – 4
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) –6 9 – – 5
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 0 12 – – 5
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 4 6 – 5
Pakistan Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 6 10 – – 3
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 5 8 None 5
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) –5 8 – – 8
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 1 6 None 1
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Annex 2 Indicators of civil and political rights (cont.)
Country Indicator Most recent Rank Change 1996
value
Pakistan (cont.) CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 2 8 + 1
Philippines Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 2 1 None 2
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 3 1 + 4
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) 8 3 None 8
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 1 6 None 1
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 7 1 None 7
Sri Lanka Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 3 4 + 4
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 3 1 + 5
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) 6 4 + 5
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 5 1 ++ 0
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 5 4 – – 9
Vietnam Freedom House – ‘Political Rights’ (2005) 7 12 None 7
Freedom House – ‘Civil Liberties’ (2005) 6 11 + 7
Polity IV – Polity II (2003) –7 10 None –7
CIRI – Physical Integrity Rights (2005) 3 5 – 5
CIRI – Empowerment Rights (2005) 0 12 None 0
Freedom House rankings use a scale from 1 to 7, giving high values to indicate low levels of political freedom
and civil liberties. The values are based on expert assessments.
The Physical Integrity Rights Index takes values from 0 (no rights) to 8 (total rights). The variable is an
aggregate of rankings for torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and disappearance.  It is based
on the frequency with which physical integrity violations are reported in the US State Department Country
Reports on Human Rights and Amnesty International’s Annual Report.
The Empowerment Rights Index takes values from 0 (no rights) to 8 (total rights). It is an aggregate measure
of indicators related to freedom of movement, freedom of speech, workers’ rights, political participation and
freedom of religion. It is based on the extent of rights are reported in the US State Department Country
Reports on Human Rights.
The Polity IV dataset measures aspects of regime authority and regime stability, based on relatively
quantitative measures of state characteristics.  The Polity II variable is a composite variable indicating the
degree of democracy in the polity, and takes values from –10 (low) to 10 (high). It incorporates variables
measuring electoral openness, electoral competitiveness, constraints on the executive and levels of political
participation.
n/a: Not available.
government agencies to broaden citizen
participation and foster accountability. Successful
models of public administration reform and
innovative tools for capacity strengthening could be
more actively shared through country-level training
institutions. Study tours and bilateral exchanges of
officials between countries in the region would
foster greater awareness of positive experiences
within the region and lessen the emphasis on
borrowing from OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development) experience. Positive
experience of governance reform in the region could
be documented more systematically and fed into the
curricula of international public administration and
training institutions.
Finally, regional organisations such as the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) are taking a more active interest in
promoting successful models of governance and
public sector reform in member states that have had
a positive bearing on growth and poverty reduction
outcomes. Based on the experience of the
Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty
Alleviation (ISACPA), SAARC is well positioned to
take a lead in collating knowledge and developing
indicators of governance that better reflect regional
priorities and experience. With the adoption of the
2020 Vision in 1997, ASEAN has declared its
intention to place capacity building and
harmonisation of policies at the centre of its
development cooperation efforts. Such efforts
provide a firm foundation for future Asian leadership
in developing strategies for strengthening state
effectiveness and governance in the region.
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Notes
1 For example, see World Bank (1997) and Khan
(2002) for contrasting approaches.
2 Elaborated in a speech on 3 February 2006 by the
UK International Development Secretary Hilary
Benn, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/
development/story/ 0,,1701411,00.html
3 This resonates closely with the ‘good enough
governance’ agenda promoted by Grindle (2004).
4 Also see East Asia Barometer: A Comparative
Survey of Democratisation and Value Changes,
http://eacsurvey.law.ntu.edu.tw; for the Asian
Survey Barometer, see www.ipsas.sinica.edu.tw
and the State of Democracy in South Asia report
at www.lokniti.org
5 See, for example, Paul (2002).
6 Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC),
2006, Bangladesh Annual Governance and Social
Trends Report (forthcoming).
7 These are the Public Service Division and the
Public Service in the 21st Century (PS21) in
Singapore (http://app.psd.gov.sg) and the Malaysian
Administrative Modernisation and Management
Planning Unit (MAMPU)
(http://mcsl.mampu.gov.my/english) in Malaysia.
8 This might prove to be an important impetus for
local governance reform in China as a means of
quelling rural discontent over poor services and
lack of accountability.
9 It could be argued that managerial reforms should
encompass accountability reforms on the grounds
that good management requires clarity in
reporting and clear channels of accountability.
10 See, for example, ADB (2000). The ADB states
that corruption can cost up to one-sixth of a
country’s GDP in the Asia–Pacific region. See
www.adb.org/Governance/gov_anti.asp
11 See Kim (2002) for an account. Website
resources are the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) Hong Kong,
www.icac.org.hk/eng, and Singapore’s Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) at
www.cpib.gov.sg
12 Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty
Alleviation (ISACPA), 2004, Our Future, Our
Responsibility, Kathmandu.
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